Category: National Politics

Introduction

October 5th, 2022, marked the 112^th anniversary of the implantation of the portuguese Republic, with the president and the prime minister attending the official Lisbon town hall ceremonies. This time, however, as a small protest of educators and instructors gathered near the country’s political power, attention began to rise for the day’s second vital symbolism – the world teachers’ day.  

Brief History:

The portuguese education system has been on shaky grounds ever since the 2008 financial crisis, with the government markedly cutting its funding between the years of 2011 and 2015, making Portugal the OECD country where teachers’ salaries dropped most significantly, and where the number of students per teacher rose most predominantly.  

Through the years, there have been significant uprisings over the teaching conditions in Portugal. 2013 saw high school teachers boycott the national student evaluation period, with direct repercussions on access to higher education, protesting against mandatory weekly working hours rising from 35 to 40. It was also a way to contest the delay in including teachers in the “special mobility” government program in which they would stop being allocated to a school district hundreds of kilometers away from their place of residence. 2018 also saw notable unrest in the streets of the capital, as educators demanded a renegotiation of their contracts that had been “frozen” ever since the beginning of the financial crisis, more than 9 years prior. 

While instructors’ teaching conditions have ever so slightly improved since the worst days of the budget crisis – with salaries finally being (partially) unfrozen, the firing spree coming to a close, and finally breaking the increasing number of students per professor trend – unsatisfaction remained strong. Most notably, as per 2016, Portugal was still below the education spending average of both OECD and EU countries.  

In what ended up to be a small gathering, the 2022 5th of October protest saw pre-school and primary school teachers advocating for a rehauling of the “Estatuto da Carreira Docente”, the set of regulations that governs the career progression, working conditions, and professional rights and obligations of teachers and educators in Portugal. Teachers, however, promised to increase the pressure. Not waiting for the end of the year, December 17^th saw a staggering 20 to 25 thousand teachers from all across the country rallying, with “Teachers fighting are also teaching” and “Teachers united will never be defeated” phrases multiplying in the crowd. Calling for the chance for school principals to be able to choose their teaching staff regardless of professional graduation, the absence of service time count that has been frozen, and penalties on retirement after 36 years of service, teachers, under the “STOP” union, announced a strike “for an undetermined amount of time”. 

Current situation:  

Continuous discontent for the state in which the education system has been for years culminated in some of the biggest teachers´ protests in memory. In February, once more under “STOP”, an estimated 150 thousand teachers took to the streets to demand better pay and a more democratic and decentralized school management system.  

The uprising continued through March, in which thousands of teachers, under “Already, here we are again” banners, paraded in Lisbon in protest against government proposals for a new recruitment and placement regime and the lack of openness to negotiate old claims such as the recovery of service time. In what heavily focused on the precariousness of the teaching profession, known for the “carrying their houses on their back” slogan due to the frequent job relocations, even teachers’ children and students came to the rally in support.  

The struggles with the impacts of the strikes have led the ministry of education to request a formal assessment of the legality of the procedures of “STOP”. It was confirmed that, despite the previous warnings made regarding strikes being legal, the execution was, in fact, dubious. Furthermore, the “Procuradoria-Geral da República” (PGR) issued comments questioning the legality of the “self-service” strike established by “STOP”, claiming to have been an “abusive” practice. Teachers have challenged these claims and accused the ministry of education of depriving them of the right to strike and protest for better working conditions. 

Ultimately, these occurrences, coupled with the increased and continuous discontent of teachers for not having their needs met, have managed to amplify the already heightened levels of tension between the two parties, making any prospect of a resolution between the government and teachers appear increasingly remote.  

What are the social implications of the movements?  

As dimensions around the strikes and protests augment exponentially within the sector, opposing opinions and positions on the matter in discussion begin to gain force, in what could jeopardize its original cause. Some professionals working in the sector recently began to view the movement as “extremist” and disagree with the way labor unions have gone about their complaints, with many arguing it to be counterproductive. Opinions are evenly divided among the portuguese people, with studies conducted informing that half the population being sampled displays support for teachers, while the other half argues that the demands are unrealistic and excessive. 

The union societies in charge have, recently, announced strikes that can affect evaluation meetings, in which grades are discussed and attributed to students per trimester. This intensification is, mainly, due to the lack of concessions on the government´s side, namely to solve the issues regarding the allocation of teachers to schools.  

Thus, questions regarding the future of the education system arise: What are the implications for students looking to apply for a higher education degree? What about students in primary school who need to learn how to read and write? What about students with special needs? Inequality and compromised evaluations are at stake and, despite being sympathetic towards the cause, parents are concerned with the future of their children.  

To combat these valid concerns about the education system and on-going disputes, teachers agreed to strike during extraordinary hours of service and non-academic endeavors at schools. 

So, do teachers have a chance at having their demands met? 

A few days after the demonstrations, a big battle was won by teachers as the government approved the new regime for the recruitment of teachers and academic personnel which has been negotiated for at least five months. However, the primary goal of compensating educators for the career freeze endured for six years, having not allowed for career development, remains elusive. 

Upon the current public manifestation for better working conditions and job satisfaction among teachers, one additional concern comes to light: the lower academic pursuits for teaching positions.  

In addition to the decreasing engagement with the profession itself, these public disputes only strengthen the newfound priority for the government within its educational systems: find solutions for the lack of professionals – as reflected in the aggravation in the number of students without a teacher in at least one subject from 60 thousand to 80 thousand in October 2022. Therefore, both parties involved will need to tread carefully to not dispirit aspiring teachers and professors even more. Considering this issue, what demands may be met with the current discussions, and can they succeed in making the job more attractive for prospective future teachers? 

The government has not yet agreed to entirely make up for the frozen years in professors’ careers. This does not mean that the government will not support teachers, since it was already stated that the asymmetries caused by the instance are set to be corrected and two years will be compensated. Additionally, modifications in the recruitment process in schools will also be dealt with to target precarity among teachers and reduce the distance between home and the school in which they are allocated. There is still, however, much discontent with the measures and the strikes do not appear to see an end to the tunnel just yet. 

Final thoughts:   

The overall consonance is that the value attributed to teachers is below par. The demands for better conditions and support for teachers are seen as valid, as these professionals compose the first pillar of society. Unlike other professions, where lack of services can be countered with outsourcing of foreign employees or alternate closing of businesses, in the teaching market these solutions are not viable. Nevertheless, there is room for innovation in the sector, as demonstrated by the adaptive measures put into practice during the COVID-19 period. 

It should be of utmost importance to guarantee the continuation and satisfaction of workers within such an instrumental function of society. As Portugal remains in the tail end of most education indicators within the EU, from number of students per teacher to early dropout rates, the government should look at these massive protests with concern.  

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Sources: Observador, SIC Notícias, FENPROF, Expresso, PÚBLICO, Diário de Notícias, Jornal de Negócios, Governo de Portugal 

On the 25^th of October of 2021, after long negotiations between the left-wing parties, the Portuguese Government’s Budget for 2022 was rejected by the Parliament. The ruling Socialist Party (PS) had been dependent on either the Left Bloc (BE) or the Unitary Democratic Coalition (CDU) for the approval of each year’s Government Budgets since the 2019 elections. In October of last year, these two parties sided with their right-wing counterparts and voted against the government’s 2022 State Budget. Consequently, on the 5th of December, President Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa officially decreed the dissolution of the Parliament and called for snap legislative elections on the 30th of January.

What did the polls say?

On the day of the election, the average of polls created by Rádio Renascença put the Socialist Party ahead in the polls with 36 % of the vote and the main opposition party, the Social Democrats, with 32.3% of the vote. Nobody could predict the winner of the election since both parties were within the margin of error, and most political analysts did not expect a defining result until long into the early morning of the next day. It was also clear that no party was polling close enough to obtain an absolute majority and the election would result in a hung parliament. The only question was: which party would come in first place?

Election day

As the exit polls came out at 8:00 pm on the main four news channels in Portugal, everyone could see that the ruling Socialist Party was on their way to a landslide victory over the Social Democrats. By late night on election day, the news networks announced the Prime Minister party had elected a majority of the deputies of the Assembleia da República and would be able to govern without the support of any other political party, a rare phenomenon in recent political history in Portugal.

The results are still provisional but as of this moment, the Socialist Party won 41.7% of the vote and elected 117 deputies (116 needed for a majority) while the Social Democrats had 29% of the vote and elected 76 deputies. In third-place, came the right-wing populist party Chega, and in fourth-place came the social and economic liberal party, Iniciativa Liberal. As for the two old partners of the government, the Left Block and the CDU lost a combined 355 thousand votes compared to the 2019 election which resulted in a reduction in their number of deputies from 31 to 11. In seventh place came the conservative Popular Party with 1.9% of the vote and, because of the characteristics of the electoral system, failed to elect a deputy for the first time since the 1974 democratic revolution. In eighth and ninth place came the animalists party PAN and the eco-socialists Livre respectively, who gathered enough support in the district of Lisbon to elected 1 deputy each.

Socialist Party’s  proposals for the next 4 years

Let us look at what the Socialist Party, also known as PS, defends in its electoral program on three key essential points; economic, social, and foreign policies. The program is 122 pages long, so it is impossible to cover everything, but we will try to go over the most important parts.

1. Economic policies

One of the most important economic and fiscal policies proposed by the governed is the creation of two additional income tax (IRS) brackets, which would give a 150 million euros tax break to the middle class and increase the progressivity of the tax. Additionally, PS proposes to increase the time span from 3 to 5 years of the IRS Jovem, a tax benefit that reduces income taxes paid by young people by an annual average of 22%. As for the minimum wage, PS defends an increase from the current 705 euros per month to 900 by 2026. Another target is the 20% increase in the average income of Portuguese workers over the next 4 years.

Regarding the government debt, which is one of the largest in Europe, PS promises to continue its policy of aiming towards a balanced budget and to reduce the debt to GDP ratio from 127.5% to 110% by 2026.

In terms of economic growth, PS does not specify concrete numbers but aims to have the GDP per capita of Portugal converge with Europe by growing 1% above the Eurozone and 0.5% above the European Union averages.

2. Social Policies

Regarding education, PS aims to invest in new educational practices and scientific-pedagogical training, as well as improving the access to higher education. The party also proposes to invest in the National Healthcare Service by constructing or renovating 100 healthcare units,  increasing primary care centers and strengthening palliative and continued care, as well as issues concerning mental health.

As for the climate crisis, the only target for 2026 is to increase to 80% the weight of renewables on energy production, however, the program sets a 55% cut on greenhouse emissions by 2030.

Although the parliament had already voted to legalize euthanasia last year, the veto by President Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa in late November means the new parliament will have to vote on this topic again this year. The PS program does not mention this topic at all, but only 7 out of 108 socialist deputies voted against the measure last year, so it is likely to pass again in 2022 with the support of the Left Block and Iniciativa Liberal.

3. Foreign policy

Regarding the European Union, the Socialists want to continue to monitor the implementation of the 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework and monitor the implementation of the Porto Social Committee that occurred last year during the Portuguese Presidency of the European Council.

As for the United Nations, the program aims to support the current reforms of the Secretary-General, elect Portugal to the UN Security Council in the biennium 2027-2028, and host the second World Oceans Conference in Lisbon this year.

In terms of bilateral relations, the program of PS wants Portugal to give priority to nearby countries, such as Spain, the UK, France, Italy, and the US. The latter is important to affirm the country’s role in being a diplomatic bridge between Europe and North America. The program also defends a reinforcement of our diplomatic network by the opening of new embassies in some countries in Africa and Asia.

What will happen now?

It is impossible to predict if the Socialist Party will be able to implement the proposals or reach the targets we can find on their electoral program, but for the first time in Antonio Costa’s premiership, his party will be able to pass laws and the government budget without the support of any other political party, meaning the responsibility of what happens in the next 4 years is now, almost for its entirety, the responsibility of the Prime Minister and his party. In 2026, or maybe even earlier, all Portuguese voters will once again head to the polls and decide whether they have indeed delivered on their promises.

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Sources: RTP, Diário de Notícias, Electoral Programs of PS, BE, CDU, CDS, IL, PAN, “Livre” and “Chega”, Público, Jornal Económico, Jornal de Notícias, Expresso, Electoral Program of PSD

On the 26th of September of 2021, every single Portuguese over the age of 18 had the opportunity to cast 3 ballots, one to elect its mayor (green), one to elect its parish council (white), and one to elect the members of its municipality assembly (yellow). In total, there were 3707 elections on this day and over thirty-five thousand people were elected across the three different local governing institutions. In no other electoral act in Portugal are so many citizens involved and elected as in the local elections the country has every 4 years.

National Results

On the national level, the ruling Socialist Party (PS) won, for a third consecutive time, this year ‘s local elections, obtaining 37.1% of the national vote. The party elected 148 mayors out of 308. In second place and with a 32.1% share of the vote, came the main opposition party, the Social Democratic Party (PSD), electing 114 mayors. The remaining 46 elected mayors are from smaller parties or independent movements.

Despite the win for the government’s party (PS), at the end of the night, they had a net-loss of 12 mayorships while the main opposition party (PSD) had a net gain of 16.

Cascais, the municipality of Nova SBE

              Our university is located right at the border of the Municipality of Cascais and all the students who live here have Carlos Carreiras as their mayor. Mr. Carreiras is 60 years old and has been mayor of Cascais since 2011. He was re-elected for a third time under a coalition called Viva Cascais which was supported by PSD and the People’s party (CDS), beating his main rival, Alexandre Faria, from the Socialist Party, by more than 30% points and winning 7 out of the 11 councilors. Viva Cascais also won all 4 of the Parish Councils. The Carcavelos e Parede Parish, where Nova SBE is located, will be presided by Nuno Alves. Contrary to Mr. Carreiras, Nuno Alves did not win a majority of the councils in the Parish (9 out of 19 mandates) so he will need to work with one of the 5 opposition parties to govern.

Carreira’s program

On his program, Carreiras proposed several measures to prepare Cascais’s economy for the post-covid world. The three main ones are policies to support local businesses to transition to the digital economy, create a digital local currency, and use Cascais as lab to the introduction of a universal basic income.

With regards to mobility, the electoral program promises to maintain free public transport for every resident in Cascais, the creation of more bike lanes plus bike-sharing stations, and the continuation of the replacement of fossil-fuel powered buses with ones that are powered by either electric engines or hydrogen.

For housing, the program includes an investment of 160 million euros (paid by European funds) in the construction of 800 houses for low-income people. Additionally, the Convent of Saint Mary of the Sea, in Carcavelos, will be renovated to offer rent-controlled residences for college students.

As for the environment, the executive led by Carreiras pledges to reduce green-house gases emissions in the municipality by 55% until 2030 and promised that every citizen of Cascais will have a green space less than 400 meters from his or her house. Despite these promises, the opposition has accused the mayor of causing the destruction of hundredths of thousands of square meters of green areas due to the substantial number of new housing units being built over the last 4 years. On top of these accusations by the opposition, due to the possible construction of a massive residential neighborhood in the “Quinta dos Ingleses,” the green area right by Nova SBE with more than 4 thousand trees, is in danger of disappearing.

Additional proposals from Carreira’s electoral program are the creation of a fund of 2.5 million to finance an e-learning scheme for the unemployed, increase in the amount of charging stations for electric vehicles, and the attribution of 25 scholarships in universities located in the municipality of Cascais, Nova SBE being one of them.

Contrary to all the other 7 candidates who ran for mayor of Cascais, the program of Carreiras is the only one that is no longer online, as the campaign website has been shut down. Thus, the information previously mentioned is not easily accessible.

Lisbon, the surprise of the night

Before the election on the 26^th of September, every single poll gave a significant advantage to the incumbent Mayor of Lisbon, Fernando Medina of the Socialist Party, to be easily re-elected. However, against all expectations, the former European Commissary for Innovation, Carlos Moedas, defeated Medina by less than 1% of the vote. Moedas led the Novos Tempos coalition, which was supported by PSD, CDS, and 4 other smaller parties. Although the former Commissary won the plurality of the votes, the Socialist Party and other left-leaning parties elected the majority of the councilors (10 of out the 17) and the deputies in the Municipality Assembly of Lisbon (41 of 75). This means the new mayor of Lisbon will have to negotiate with the opposition to successfully implement the electoral program promised to the citizens of Lisbon.

Moeda’s program

              One of Moedas biggest campaign’s promised was to offer free public transportation for people who are under the age of 23, 65 or older, unemployed, and handicapped. In addition to free public transport for some residents of Lisbon, the “Yellow-Bus” program would guarantee free transportation to school for children in primary school. Moedas also wants to expand the metro line in Lisbon by building new stations in Alcântara, Miraflores, and Algés. If you are a monthly subscriber to monthly public transportation pass, Moedas also wants to include the bike sharing planform in Lisbon, called Gira, in the bundle of methods of transport that you can use.

Although the new Mayor promised a lot to the users of public transportation, car users will benefit from parking meters that are 50% cheaper plus 20 minutes of free parking per day in the city.

              Another campaign promise was the exception of the municipal tax on the transaction of properties to buyers under the age of 35 who are buying their first house. This measure could save young home buyers thousands of euros in taxes. The municipality will also return 32 million euros in income taxes to its residents. However, these last two measures could be rejected by the opposition as they have been accused of benefiting wealthier individuals; this is supported by the fact that 60% of Lisbon residents do not make enough money to pay income taxes, and young first-time home buyers tend to be wealthier than younger people who are renters.

As for climate related policies, the Moedas is not as ambitious as the former Mayor, who had promised to cut emissions in the city by 70% until 2030. Despite these smaller focus on the climate crisis, his program includes a modernization of the flood preventing system of the city, the promotion of solar panels in buildings, and the gradual implementation of a “Pay As You Throw” system of garbage collection to prevent waste.

Additional proposals on Moedas’ electoral program are the creating of a grid of free Wi-Fi in Lisbon, the creation of cultural centers in every neighborhood of the city, and free health insurance for seniors.

For the coming 4 years, both Lisbon and Cascais will have mayors from the center-right Social Democratic Party, although both Moedas and Carreiras were elected under an electoral coalition that involved other political parties. Whether or not the two politicians will be able to implement their electoral programs is impossible to know, but 4 years from now, all the Portuguese voters, including the ones from these two municipalities, will have the opportunity to scrutinize their local leaders with their vote, or even by running for office.

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Sources: Expresso, Cascais24, TSF, RTP, SICNoticias, Publico, ONovo.

THE BACKGROUND: A (quick) political overview

Brazil’s past is no fairy tale. From 1964 to 1985, the country was governed by a military dictatorship. Although promised to last a few years, it took two decades for the nation to freely choose its leaders once again. The long years of authoritarianism left, however, a deep footprint difficult to cover in the transition towards democracy.

Instability is at the heart of a country whose motto reads “Order and Progress”. The men and women, that once promised to serve the country, have failed. Historically, elected presidents had a certain pattern: wealthy, full of promises’ mandates marked by economic distress but, mostly, corruption. The hopes (and fears) of the nation focused on Lula da Silva, a working-class man, that promised to save Brazil from corruption and poverty. In the latter, he saw a slight success, but in the former, he saw himself and his protected successor Dilma Roussef being involved in the greatest corruption scheme in Brazil.

In 2018, the elections shone a light on how Brazil had become divided. Those who remembered the dictatorship, feared the return of authoritarianism, while others had had enough of the system and rallied behind Jair Bolsonaro. In the end, Bolsonaro emerged as the 38^th president with 55,1% of the votes. Now we ask ourselves how this once marginal political figure ended up winning half of the country’s trust, and how his influence evolved throughout the mandate and the current pandemic.

THE CAUSES: What led Brazil to its current state?

I. A Never-ending Internal Battlefield

In 2017, Brazil was facing a record-breaking number of around 65.000 homicides; a country representing 8% of the world’s population accounted for 33% of all murders. This ever-growing trend of violence, stemming largely from drug gang rivalries, was further aggravated by the ill-management of security funds, which left police forces underpaid and underprepared. The established chaos fuelled police violence, including extrajudicial executions, which only undermined public security and further endangered the lives of police officers.

This incited support for the far-right candidate, who praised the armed forces and promised loosening gun laws and making the police force more affirmative. For many, this stuck a chord and Bolsonaro became a champion of law and order, most notably for a young core of supports, to whom the thought of oppression and violence of the military regime had faded into history.

At the end of 2019, Bolsonaro had seemed to uphold his campaign promise. Killings were down 19% from the previous year, reaching the lowest number since 2007. There were, however, doubts regarding his involvement in this feat, as the number had already begun to fall in early 2018 and the leader had signed an anti-crime bill at the end of 2019. Reports of a militia-run Rio de Janeiro – organized crime groups that control entry into neighbourhoods, run extortions and drug trade, i.a. – only seem to disprove this claim.

II. A Never-fully-honest Government

Though the war on violence gathered a large following, what secured Bolsonaro’s candidacy was the conviction of his strongest opponent, Lula da Silva, which barred him from the presidential race. The former president of Brazil was, however, only one of several convicted in one of the biggest corruption investigations of the recent ages, “Operation Car Wash”. It uncovered a laundry scheme that funnelled billions into politicians’ and big companies’ pockets. According to a Datafolha study, the general public’s faith in Brazilian institutions had eroded over the years, with trust in the presidency and congress falling below 40%. Bolsonaro seized this opportunity to emerge as an outlier and promised to end corruption.

Almost two years later, both the president and his family have been ensnared in corruption scandals. Most notably, his oldest son and former senator of Rio de Janeiro, Flávio Bolsonaro, was charged this past November of embezzlement, money laundering and criminal association.

The very probe, that shed light on the institutional corruption in Brazil via “Operation Car Wash”, has now wound down following pressure from parts of Congress as well as the Bolsonaro administration. The outbreak of the Coronavirus has only helped Brasilia in sweeping any talk of corruption under the rug.

III. A Never-stable Economy (in the heat of a pandemic crisis)

Social and political instability were not all that troubled the nation, which was coming out of the worst recession in its recent history. The economy had barely grown for almost a decade, incurring even in contractions. Both the commodities’ boom and tourism, one of the country’s largest economic motors, had collapsed. Inflation and unemployment had risen significantly, the former reaching 10.7%, in 2015, and the latter reaching a century-high value of 12.82%, in 2017.

Efforts of Bolsonaro’s administration to depart from the status quo of deep recessions were cut short as Brazil was hit severely by the global pandemic. Today, the country has the second highest death toll in the world and more than 2,000 daily deaths from Covid-19, which might be higher due to lack of reporting. In a country struggling with inequality, the disease has struck distinctly among social classes, affecting mostly people living in extreme poverty, who are less able to follow social distancing and other health norms. There are more than 14 million people unemployed, an astonishingly high number, since 40% of the workforce depends on daily wages to eat and survive.

At the beginning of the pandemic, a stimulus package of 50 bn$ was widely credited for Bolsonaro’s popularity and for boosting the economy. However, the president continued to dismiss and even mock health measures, while strongly questioning official statistics. He incited public disrespect of curfews and fired those who did not agree with him, such as the health minister.

Now, there is a new smaller stimulus package on its way. The package enables Bolsonaro’s administration to relaunch a cash transfer scheme to the nation’s poorest during the next four months, while limiting the impact on fiscal accounts, since investors are worried with debt rising above 90% of GDP. There are, nonetheless, questions as to whether they will be able to keep people from hunger.

IV. A Never-equal society and a Never-prioritized Environment

Bolsonaro’s mandate is full of controversies created by strong statements of the president against the LGBTQ+ community, black minorities, and women. His promise to make “Brazil safe for all its people” might not be real after all, as, socially, he turned out to be polarising, and excluding minorities. In addition, Bolsonaro and his government’s denialism of climate change remains unchanged. As widespread fires hit the Amazon forest last summer, the president intends to exploit deforested lands, rather than preserve them, which will severely affect indigenous communities.

Brazil: A Never-united country?

As the 2022 presidential elections draw ever closer, it seems the division that plagued the country four years ago has only deepened. Despite unfulfilled promises and mismanagement of the ongoing health crisis, Bolsonaro has managed to maintain a significant following.

New developments have seemed, albeit, to undermine his re-election campaign. Former president Lula da Silva has been released by the supreme court of justice, which decided to overturn graft convictions. While the decision has yet to be finalized, it has set the scene for a contest between opposite sides of the political spectrum in next year’s presidential race.

As the emerging candidate once said, “We all know that, all over the world, never did the workers’ win a single thing without fighting, without perseverance.” It remains to be seen who the nation will be fighting for.

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Sources: BBC, Britannica, CSIS, Financial Times, Folha de S.Paulo, Forbes, the Guardian, Latin America Reports, Open Democracy, Vox, FRED, Human Rights Watch, Abc News

On the 2^nd of June of 1946, following Mussolini’s fascist regime, Italy finally became a democracy. Since then, 67 governments and 30 Prime Ministers (PM) rose to power, some more than once, in only 75 years, hinting at the instability of Italian politics.  

This past January, the country was confronted with yet another political hardship. Italia Viva’s leader Matteo Renzi disagreed with the government’s allocation of over 200 billion euros of EU funds, intended to tackle the country’s crises. Renzi wanted the funds to be spent in new infrastructure projects, while former PM Giuseppe Conte was planning on appointing a panel of experts to direct the allocation. In response, Renzi withdrew two ministers from Conte’s government, making him lose majority in Parliament. Unable to form a government, Conte resigned. Hence, President Sergio Mattarella decided to appoint a technocrat, Mario Draghi, to form government, as calling for early elections would not be advised during a pandemic. 

What awaits Mario Draghi?  

I. CORONAVIRUS  

Draghi is confronted with an Italy in deep economic recession amidst a global pandemic. The country was the first in Europe to impose a nation-wide lockdown last March and during the second surge, in the Fall, Italy reached almost 100 thousand virus-related deaths. Falling behind its vaccination program, blaming delivery delays, and having a national pandemic plan that has not been updated since 2006, Italy urgently needs a structural reform. 

Draghi’s main objective is to accelerate the national vaccination program. He stated that his «main duty […] is to fight the pandemic with all means and safeguard the lives of our fellow citizens». For this purpose, he intends to mobilize the armed forces, civilian volunteers, and civil protection units. As such, the civil protection agency’s chief and Italy’s COVID-19 commissioner were already fired. The latter was substituted by an army logistics expert. Additionally, the PM hopes to enact reforms on the health sector such as strengthening local hospitals and community health services.  

II. ECONOMY 

Italy is living its worst recession since World War II, with –10,6% real GDP growth rate in 2020, one of the lowest in the euro zone. The unemployment rate is around 9,84% and expected to rise after a possible lift in employment dismissals ban. Although it has been decreasing recently, youth unemployment marginally increased to 30,9% in 2020. Several EU Member States worry about the country’s public debt, 4^th largest in the world, estimated to rise to almost 160% of 2021’s GDP. Italy’s economic issues are structural: real GDP per capita has barely grown in the last two decades; the labor force shows low productivity and fails to integrate young workers; the business environment is unattractive and uncompetitive, owing to the red tape, legal and tax systems affecting corporations. 

The root of Italy’s most recent political crisis, the allocation of 200 billion euros in EU funds  will be Draghi’s challenge. The EU program, NextGenerationEU, is heavily directed towards the digitalization of the economy, the ecological transition, R&D, and healthcare. The PM stated he would follow the previous government’s proposal, assuring that it would be strengthened with more details «in the coming weeks». 

Mario Draghi has major economics functions in his curriculum. A graduate from “La Sapienza” University in Rome, he received his PhD from MIT, where he was mentored by renowned economists such as Solow and Modigliani. He was Director General of the Italian Treasury and, in 2006, became Governor of the Bank of Italy, until being nominated President of the European Central Bank (ECB), in 2011.  

Draghi’s background led him to the forefront of European monetary policy regulation until 2019, carrying the weight of the 2008 financial crisis and following sovereign debt crisis. On the 26th of July 2012, as ECB President, Draghi proclaimed three words that defined the turning point in the crisis, reclaiming investors’ trust: “Whatever it takes”, implying that the Euro would sustain any backlash regardless the cost.  Now, he assumes responsibility over a highly fragile Italian economy.  

POLITICS 

I. Asking a technocrat for help… for the fourth time 

Draghi is the fourth technocrat in three decades invited to lead. In Italy, citizens elect Parliament representatives, body composed by the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. The creation of a government occurs when the new chambers take office and elect their Presidents. It is albeit often difficult to form a government because parties do not always obtain a majority, obliging the leading forces to negotiate. These resulting coalitions have often been ephemeral. It is in times of crisis and when elections are too risky, such as in January, that Italy’s President may appoint an expert. 

Although many share Renzi’s belief that “[Draghi] saved Europe, he will save Italy”, past experiences with technocrats have not always been positive. The first was formal central banker Azeglio Ciampi (1993-1994) amidst a recession and following a large political corruption scandal. Shortly after was the International Monetary Fund’s executive director, Lamberto Dini (1995-1996). Finally, in 2011 and due to political failures, former European commissioner Mario Monti was appointed. His policies included pension reforms and strong austerity measures, which did not resonate with the electorate. Although the economy did somewhat improve, his elections campaign was not good enough to save him and his coalition, coming in fourth place in the following elections.  

Almost all major figures and parties support Draghi’s government, which includes both experts and professional politicians. Overall, many consider resorting to technocratic governments temporary solutions which forget underlying problems such as corruption, leading to constant political instability. Additionally, some consider such governments to be anti-democratic, as they include figures which have not been chosen through representative democracy. According to an EU survey in 2019, 82% of Italians claim they “tend not to trust” their politicians, a sentiment which has materialized into increased support for the anti-establishment 5-star movement.  

II. More than a technocrat  

Mario Draghi is not any technocrat. Having been ECB’s President, he is known for his negotiation and rhetoric skills. His appointment comes at a time when Europe is facing difficult administrative challenges. According to The Economist’s Ben Hall, he «gives the French leader a partner in Rome who is a powerful and credible advocate of closer European integration just at the time when Germany prepares for a change in leadership». 

Draghi’s global respect is one of the main differences from his technocratic predecessors. Being largely credited for saving Europe during the sovereign debt crisis, not only does he intend to save Italy from this crisis, but to introduce structural and social measures. 

III. Bigger dreams 

In fact, the new PM’s aspirations for Italy are not limited to solving the economic and health crises. He plans on instating several structural reforms, for instance in the legal system, education, and public administration, as well as adjusting Italy’s tax system. While addressing Italy’s Senate, he stressed the importance of closing salary gaps and strengthening the welfare system, with the intent increasing the number of women in the labor force. Lastly, he paid special attention to Italy’s younger generation, stating that a vast number of talented people led the country to seek more prosperous futures over the last 20 years, which can be achieved by improving training and career prospects nationally.  

With an existing history of technocratic governments failing to resolve important structural issues, some might feel skeptical regarding Draghi’s success probabilities, defending that a career politician might be more suited for the position of PM. Nevertheless, his career path has demonstrated strong political, negotiation, and rhetorical skills, bringing hope to a country in need of deep reform in many fronts. Will Mario Draghi’s appointment bring real change, or is history just repeating itself? 

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Sources  

AP News, Barrons, Bloomberg, CNBC, DW, Economist, Euractiv, European Central Bank, European Comission, Eurotopics, Expresso, Financial Times, Guardian, Jacobin, NBC News, Político Europe, Reuters, SIC Notícias, Statista, The Local, U.S. News 

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Portugal left wing history

The Third Portuguese Republic was implemented after the Carnation Revolution on April 25th, 1974. This movement overthrew the fascist regime that had been in power since 1933, established by António de Oliveira Salazar, the main figure of Estado Novo (“New State”).

The first democratic elections in 1975 were won by the Socialist Party (PS). Thereafter, the only parties with a majority in Parliament or with a respective prime minister were the socialists or the social-democrats (PSD). Other parties would only be part of the government through coalitions. Historically, Europe is categorized as moderate inclining towards social democracy.

In recent years, Europe, Portugal included, have witnessed a rise in radical right movements. Portugal’s main figure is Chega! (Enough!), a rightist, populist movement led by André Ventura. Although not the first party located further right of the Portuguese political spectrum, it was the first to gain notoriety and a seat in Parliament. The former National Renovating Party (PNR) is a self entitled far right party with very narrow public adherence.

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André Ventura

 André Ventura, born on January 15th, 1983, had a brief passage through the seminary (an attempt to follow priesthood), which fits some of his catholic conservative statements. Ventura ended up pursuing Law at Nova University of Lisbon, graduating with a 19/20 GPA. The PhD thesis  he presented at Cork University criticized the stigmatisation of minorities and expressed his concerns on the expansion of repressive powers from the state.

In 2001, he joined the Social Democratic Party but only gained visibility in 2017 as a sports commentator on national television. This led to an invitation inside the party to run for the local elections of the Loures municipality. As a candidate, Ventura claimed that Roma people residing in Loures “live almost exclusively on public subsidies” and “think they are above the Rule of Law”. His declarations and hostile position over various social matters hindered the relationship with PSD leading to his disaffection from the party in 2018. In

April 2019 he founded Chega!. Representing it, André Ventura ran for the 2019 legislative elections (providing him a seat in Parliament), and is currently running for the 2021 presidential elections.

Chega!

“The Portuguese far right party” built its marketing as an anti-system movement – it claims the establishment is corrupt and does not have the people’s best interests in mind. The party seeks to establish a new and Fourth Republic by, among other measures, implementing a new constitution, as can be read in its manifesto (2019). The latter is intensely economically liberal and endorses a minimalist State on, for instance, education and healthcare services. Its political program includes fiscal reforms: the abolishment of double taxation on corporate income; reduction of VAT; and the adoption of a “flat income tax”.

On the other hand, Chega is strongly conservative on societal issues, which include motions such as the prohibition of gay marriage, of LGBTQ+ propaganda, abortion or any situation that “violates human integrity”. Furthermore, its program introduces chemical castration as a legal punishment for convicted pedophiles, among other severe penalties. Chega recently affiliated to ID (Identity and Democracy), a European parliamentary group composed of nationalists, far-right parties and eurosceptics, namely Alternative for Germany, National Rally (Marine Le Pen) and Lega Nord (Matteo Salvini). The group stands for national differentiation and administrative preservation of autonomy, alternatively to a European selfhood. Chega first presented a candidate for the european elections in 2019, leading a coalition named Basta!. It failed to elect a MEP.

The latest October 2020 legislative poll, conducted by Aximage, placed it with 5,4% of vote intentions. This consistent growth was confirmed by the regional elections in the Azores. The party gained 5% of votes, fourth most voted. Two regional MPs were elected and with no clear majority of votes in the elections, these two will be fundamental for the configuration of the new regional government. The party has gained recognition and consolidated its political force.

Electorate’s Profile

Studies conducted to identify the typical voter of a far-right party in Europe concluded  he is a young poorly qualified male. Generally, he is a worker or a small businessman, if not unemployed.

In Portugal, the first study to provide an identification of this typical voter was a poll published last February by ICS/ISCTE. Given the European context, it came to contrasting conclusions. The typical radical right elector in Portugal has qualifications above the mean of the Portuguese population, mainly middle-class, namely office employees living in metropolitan areas. Furthermore, the electorate is evenly split between male and female. According to CESOP, the voters of the party previously voted for the two main parties or abstained.

Reasons for Widespread Growth

Populism is a political approach, which strives to appeal to ordinary people who feel their concerns are disregarded. The 2008 crisis and subsequent stagnation significantly worsened the middle class. Their substantial tax burden and the subsidies paid to those who “do not respect the Rule of Law” lure them to Chega, as proven in the ICS/ISCTE poll.

André Ventura often appropriates the popular contempt with a dividing logic of “us” against “them”. There is a large share of society which, after being constantly immersed in scandals and corruption at the highest levels of Public Administrations, feel as if “all politicians are the same”. André Ventura’s concept is appealing to the average Portuguese, who possess a sense of distrust towards politicians in general, thus embracing the anti-system propaganda. This could be why Chega has developed a hostile environment with most parties. This, paired with its image as a xenophobic and racist party, influences other parties to distance themselves, afraid of an electoral backlash.

Cultural liberalization and imigration are pointed out as troubles by Chega. In its manifesto, there are many references to an ideological proselytism: the attempt to change people’s beliefs. This concept is referent to LGBTQ+, BLM and other movements, which Chega frequently lessens, attracting social conservatives and clashing with leftists.Likewise, Chega seeks to strain the process of granting Portuguese citizenship, standing fiercely against the recent Nationality Law, eventually enacted. Illegal immigration is adressed by Ventura, although the Portuguese electorate cannot relate to that issue as well as larger European countries: contrarily to what happened to countries such as Germany, Greece or Italy, the Portuguese borders have only had some minor predicaments with refugees, never a worrying affair. Therefore, regarding intercultural matters, the main argument brought up by the party has been directed towards the Roma people and others living on subsidies. The leader of the party often accuses them of not complying with Portuguese laws, women’s and marriage rights, as well as respect for authority. During the pandemic, Ventura supported a special confinement for a Roma community outside a small city that refused to be subject to testing.

Nonetheless, the main explanation regarding the rampant rise of this party is the spotlight offered by the media in general, and the wideness of Ventura’s presence in social media. There have been weekly constant mentions and polemics around his name and party. Correspondingly, that has been the method chosen by European far-right parties which appears to be successful. Also, the fact that mainstream parties commonly criticize him helps the branding of the party as the solution for a damaged structure (given the “system” is against him, he should then be considered “anti-system”).

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Conclusion

Portugal is not an exception anymore. In 2018, it belonged to a short list of countries in the EU without radical right representation in the Parliament. Today, it is another example of a substantial expansion of such a movement in a compact period of time. Nonetheless, it is important to say that Chega is not the typical far right party, for the latter (former PNR) has failed and lost vote intention to the earlier. The death penalty, a more extreme proposal, was presented and failled to gather internal support. Some claim the party is imploding due to an even more radical branch that starts to label Chega as another conventional party.

TURKEY’S PAST represents prosperity and pride for the Turkish people. The vast Ottoman Empire which spread across the European, Asian and African continents fell just before the end of World War I. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, former Turkish president, led Turkish people against invaders during WWI and, in 1923, implemented a secularist and independent republic. Turkey joined NATO in 1952 under the Democratic Party, which many saw as the “saviour of Islam”. Due to its closeness to religion, the party was overthrown in 1960 following a coup by the armed forces. In recent decades, Turkey has long been entangled in internal divisions between leftists and rightists, the latter often associated with nationalist islamists.

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Political ascendance

Already from a young age, Erdogan was known for his oratory skills defending the Islamist cause. During his studies at Marmara University’s Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, from where he graduated in 1981, Erdogan embodied the cause of nationalist students’ movements. He was part of the islamist Welfare Party, which was later banned following accusations of religious meddling in government affairs. His Justice and Development Party (AKP), which he co-founded in 2001 and persists to this day, was also imposed financial penalties for anti-secularist behaviour in 2008.

Erdogan was first elected for a political office in 1994, as mayor of Istanbul. He was elected then prime-minister in 2003 and later, in 2014, rather than being chosen by the parliament, he was elected president of Turkey by universal suffrage, for the first time in the country’s history.

Internal Policies

In 1998, Erdogan was convicted for inciting religious hatred after reciting a poem that compared mosques to barracks, minarets to bayonets, and the faithful to an army. In fact, he progressively started promoting authoritarian and islamist initiatives. He prohibited alcoholic beverages in the city’s cafes as mayor of Istanbul and later lifted the headscarves ban in public institutional places. He also unsuccessfully attempted to criminalize adultery.

Erdogan frequently expressed pronatalist views, against reproductive rights, birth control, and abortion. The government has thus promoted financial incentives to encourage family growth, such as a severance payment to newly married women who leave their job within a year after their wedding.

Furthermore, Erdogan’s control of religion in society largely passes through his policies on education. Under the AKP, the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) plays a central role, and the Imam Hatip Okulları (IHLs), which used to be religious courses, are now equivalent to secondary schools. In 2011, the AKP decreased university entry barriers to IHL students. In 2018, those constituted 12% of the total secondary school population, an increase of about 3.4 percentage points since 1997.

In 2013, a large-scale US$100 billion corruption scandal, involving two of Erdogan`s sons, culminated in the arrests of Erdogan’s closest allies, with some political figures being dismissed from office.

In that same year, the Gezi Park protests erupted in Istanbul and later spread across the country. This represented an anti-government uprise against growing authoritarian and islamist initiatives. In fact, a law penalizing insults towards the head of state, in practice since 1926, had rarely been used before Erdogan. Until 2016, more than 1500 people have allegedly been investigated, kept in custody or imprisoned under this law. Critics accuse the party of significant control of the media and public opinion, oppression of political opponents, and an overall violation of freedom of speech.

In 2016, the military orchestrated an unsuccessful coup to strip the president off his title. In response, Erdogan ordered mass arrests and show trials. In 2017, he won a referendum, backed by 51% of voters, which strengthened his constitutional competence. This granted him the power to directly appoint top public officials, including ministers and vice-presidents, to intervene in the legal system, and possibly remain in office until 2029, in addition to abolishing Turkey’s parliamentary system.

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Economy

As mayor of Istanbul, Erdogan strived to overcome the city’s main problems: setting up new recycling facilities, developing natural gas projects to clean the air, and introducing hundreds of kilometers of new pipeline to ensure water supply. Macroeconomic reforms attracted more foreign investors, which allowed for more infrastructure projects such as the construction of bridges, passageways, and freeways. Concerning Erdogan’s early years as prime-minister, Zafer Caglayan, the former Economic Affairs Minister, described them as the «Turkish Miracle». In fact, for most of the 2000s, Turkey was Europe’s fastest growing economy, reaching an annual growth rate of 7%. Between 2002 and 2012, the country’s Real GDP increased 64%, while GDP per capita increased 43%. Additionally, as prime-minister, Erdogan implemented reforms and increased investment in infrastructure such as roads, airports, and a high-speed train network.

However, since 2013, the «Turkish Miracle» has been fading as Turkey has been witnessing the abandonment of soft power. In 2014, growth fell to 2.9% and unemployment rose above 10%.

Turkey’s intervention in several international conflicts, such as the Israeli-Palestinian and the Turkish-Kurdish, also contributed to its economy flagging. Between 2016 and 2017, several rating agencies downgraded Turkey’s sovereign credit ratings, expressing their concern about rule of law and the pace of economic reforms. With investors’ confidence declining since 2016, US sanctions imposed against Turkey in 2018, and staggering inflation, the economy reached a recession at the end of the year, urging the government to implement measures to alleviate pressure on the population. The lira dropped by 40% against the dollar, while industrial production slowed and housing sales dropped. Since then, the party has been increasingly losing control over the economy, with significant consequences during the 2019 local elections, losing both the capital Ankara and Istanbul.

III. Foreign Policy

Regarding foreign policy, Erdogan has focused on defending the Islamist cause worldwide, intervening in several international conflicts, which he perceives as beneficial for national security. He sees himself not only as the savior of Muslims but also as of «all the aggrieved people in our region, all the oppressed in the world», as he stated in his victory speech in 2018.

The conflict with the Kurds has led Turkey to occupy north-eastern Syria. Firstly, Erdogan’s aim was to stabilize the regions in the country controlled by rebels who wanted to end Bashar al-Assad’s regime, a strategy to stop floods of refugees to cross the border. But since Kurdish forces have controlled Syria’s northern region, taking advantage of the withdrawal of US troops, Erdogan pushed them out.

Simultaneously, a war of words between Greece and Turkey has been escalating over Mediterranean waters. Erdogan signed a deal with Libya’s unbacked government, allegedly granting Turkey´s access to Greek waters and gas reserves. In August this year, Turkey sent a ship to exploit hydrocarbon offshore, deepening the tensions. The EU, although having abandoned negotiations with Turkey in 2016, accusing it of basic human rights violations, has appealed for dialogue. To this day tensions between Turkey and the block still persist, notably regarding the refugee crisis.

Concerning the east, Turkey has seen its ties with China strengthen, signing bilateral agreements on health and nuclear energy, while ignoring the Muslim Uighurs’ modern concentration camps. On top of that, Erdogan has shown support for repressive regimes, such as Nicolas Maduro’s.

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Conclusion

Since his rise to power, Erdogan’s grip of Turkey has been increasingly marked by authoritarian policies. Initially praised for turning around the country’s economy, Erdogan’s disregard of the rule of law and human rights have put him under fire in the international scene.

But his focus on social values is two-sided: they both reflect his personal views as well as the source of where he harnesses support. In July of this year, the Turkish President ruled that the 1,500-year-old Byzantine Hagia Sophia, a former cathedral turned mosque which until recently served as a museum established by Ataturk, would once again become a mosque. The move, which sparked international outcry, served as a strategy for Erdogan to ensure his popularity, as he avidly relies on his conservative supporters. In fact, the government has been criticized for mishandling the Coronavirus pandemic as the mayors of Istanbul and Ankara, Turkey’s two largest cities, accused it of covering up the real numbers. This precarious and uncertain situation, alongside a frail economy, raises questions on the future of Erdogan’s controversial leadership.